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The present paper extends the literature on central bank transparency that 
relies on information heterogeneity among private agents in four directions. 
First, it adds the interest rate to the list of signals that the central bank can 
reveal. Second, it allows for more than one economic fundamental. Third, it 
extends the range of uncertainties that matter. So far the literature has focused 
on uncertainty about the economic fundamentals, assumed to be estimated 
with known precision; we also allow for uncertainty about precision. Fourth, 
it derives results that are general in the sense that they do not depend on any 
particular social welfare criterion. Each extension sheds new light on the role 
of central bank transparency. 
 
While uncertainty about the fundamentals results in the now familiar 
common knowledge effect, uncertainty about information precision creates a 
fog effect, which reduces the quality of decision taken by the central bank 
and the private sector. In the absence of the fog effect, full transparency is 
generally not desirable, because it deprives the central bank from the ability 
to optimally manipulate private sector expectations. When the central bank 
fog is large, full transparency is usually the best communication strategy, 
even when the private sector fog is large. We also find that it is usually 
desirable for the central bank to divulge some information, even if it is 
erroneous.  
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Central banks have become increasingly transparent, but just how transparent should
they be? Some central banks strive to reveal just about everything that is relevant;
this is the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, of the Bank of Norway and of
Sweden￿ s Riksbank. Others are more circumspect; they consider that there may be
too much transparency, see e.g. Bean (2005).1 Likewise, the academic literature is di-
vided about the welfare case for full transparency. Blinder (1998) argues that central
banks should be as transparent as possible. As further elaborated by Svensson (2005)
and Woodford (2005), the economic case for transparency rests on the dominant role
played by expectations of private agents when they make decisions on prices, spend-
ing and production. When the main channels of monetary policy operate through
expected in￿ ation, long-term interest rates, asset prices and exchange rates, central
banks are most e⁄ective when the private sector fully understands their intentions.
Yet Cukierman (2007) observes that transparency may back￿re, for instance when
uncertainty about the economy, including our understanding of the economy, is large
or because a high degree of transparency can provide a distorted view of what the
central bank knows and intends to achieve.
At a very general level, in an Arrow-Debreu world with complete markets, trans-
parency is always desirable (Hellwig, 2005). In a more realistic setting, second best ar-
guments are bound to uncover cases where some degree of opacity welfare-dominates
transparency. The literature has mostly focused on two generic departures from
market completeness, building two in￿ uential cases for some degree of central bank
opacity.
The ￿rst case for limiting transparency starts with the ￿ constructive ambiguity￿
argument initially advanced by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). The argument rests
on two assumptions: 1) only unanticipated money matters (Kydland and Prescott,
1977) and 2) the central bank preferences are not precisely known by the public
(Vickers, 1986). Under these combined assumptions, some degree of opacity enhances
monetary policy e⁄ectiveness because a fully transparent central bank cannot create
surprises.2 These assumptions have become less appealing. New Keynesian models
do not provide support to the "only unanticipated money matter" view, already con-
vincingly criticized by McCallum (1995) and Blinder (1998). The view has also been
undermined by central bank practice; far from concealing their preferences, today￿ s
central banks clearly specify their objectives, as is the case with the increasingly
popular in￿ ation targeting strategy.
Heterogeneous information provides the second in￿ uential case for limited trans-
parency. Morris and Shin (2002, 2005) - henceforth referred to as M&S - argue that
central banks should not reveal all the information at their disposal. Their argu-
1For the sake of completeness, we note that an important reason for transparency is democratic
accountability. We do not pursue this argument further.
2For review of this literature, see Geraats (2002).
2ment does not appeal to the assumptions of the constructive ambiguity literature. It
rests instead on three di⁄erent assumptions: 1) the information available to both the
central bank and the private sector is noisy; 2) the central bank￿ s signals are seen by
everyone in the private sector; and 3) private sector agents form forecasts that are
just as precise as possible but also as close as possible to the consensus forecast (a
case of strategic complementarity). The last assumption, which goes back to Keynes￿
celebrated beauty contest e⁄ect, is meant to capture the basic principle that it is rela-
tive prices that matter in competitive markets. An implication of the beauty contest
assumption is that everyone knows that everyone else observes the same central bank
signals. A consequence is the common knowledge e⁄ect: relative to private informa-
tion, central bank signals receive undue attention in the sense that their impact will
not just re￿ ect their quality. It follows that it may be desirable for the central bank to
withhold releasing its information when the quality of its signals is not good enough.
This in￿ uential result has been shown not to be robust. Svensson (2005) observes
that, in practice, the quality of central bank signals is unlikely to be su¢ ciently poor
to justify withholding information. Woodford (2005) observes that the result occurs
because M&S use a welfare function that ignores the negative welfare e⁄ect of price
dispersion. This general observation is further developed in Hellwig (2005) and Roca
(2006).
The present paper extends the analysis of information heterogeneity in a number
of directions. To start with, most of the literature contrasts just two regimes, opacity
and transparency. One exception is Walsh (2007), which explores the optimum degree
of transparency by allowing the central bank to release its information to subgroups
of private agents; optimality refers to the size of the subgroups that receive and act
upon the information. It seems to us that central banks take great pain to ensure
that their information is strictly not preferentially distributed. Partial transparency,
as we see it, refers to the share of information that is released. To that e⁄ect, we
allow for more than one economic fundamental and to di⁄erent types of information.
Publication of the interest rate is now common practice even though, as is well
known, the Federal Reserve did not reveal its interest rate until 1994. That change
represents a major step towards more transparency. But the extensive attention
devoted by central bank watchers to policy announcements suggests that the interest
rate acts a crucial signal that does not seem to have studied so far. In our model the
interest rate is one element of the information set that a central bank may decide to
reveal. This allows us to consider at least three transparency regimes: full opacity,
when the central bank does not release any private information; partial transparency,
when the central bank only reveals its interest rate decision; and full transparency,
when the central bank tells it all, i.e. also publishes its signals on the fundamentals.
The interest rate is a special signal because, unlike information about the state
of the economy, it can be used by the central bank to a⁄ect market expectations. In
other words, it is a manipulable signal.3 We push this logic to its end and assume
3Of course, the central bank can also manipulate its other signals by not being truthfull about
3that the interest rate is only a signaling device and that it does not play any direct
macroeconomic role. Admittedly, this is an extreme assumption, but it allows us to
focus on this important aspect of interest rate decisions.
Another aspect of the literature is that, typically, the precision of the heteroge-
neous signals received by the central bank and private sector agents - the inverse of
signal variance - is assumed to be known with certainty. Here we allow for imperfect
knowledge of signal precision and we ￿nd that it makes an important di⁄erence.
As already mentioned, some controversies about the desirability of central trans-
parency revolve around the choice of the social welfare criterion. Even though some
authors derive this criterion from microfoundations, many assumptions creep in along
the way. We deal with this problem in two ways. First, we adopt the general so-
cial welfare function proposed by Hellwig (2005), which encompasses some important
special cases. In addition, whenever possible, we derive results that are general in
the sense that they do not depend on any social welfare function.
Our main interest is not just to determine which transparency regime is best.
Much of the emphasis is on how central bank transparency, or the lack thereof,
a⁄ects the economy through private expectations. The story we tell is one where the
interest rate allows the central bank to shape expectations. By optimally choosing
the interest rate, the central bank can deal with the unavoidable common knowledge
e⁄ect in a way that is welfare enhancing. That tends to make partial transparency
preferable to full transparency because in the latter case the interest rate does not
convey any additional information and cannot be used by the central bank to shape
private sector expectations. If, however, the central bank misestimates the private
sector signal precision, its optimally chosen interest rate may do more harm than
good. This tends to make full transparency the best regime choice.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model, which
extends much of the literature by allowing for any ￿nite number of economic fun-
damentals. Beyond its generality, this extension is needed as we assume throughout
that the central bank optimally sets the interest rate; with just one fundamental, the
interest rate would fully re￿ ect the central bank signal on that fundamental. Since
the central bank optimally sets the interest rate to maximize social welfare, it must
form a forecast of the private sector information precision. Section 3 considers the
case when the precision of the central bank and private sector information is per-
fectly known to both the central bank and the private sector. In this case, partial
transparency dominates full transparency - unless all signals are drawn form the same
distribution - because the central bank can adequately in￿ uence private sector expec-
tations. In Section 4, the precision of private sector signals is unknown to the central
bank but known to the private sector. As a result, the central bank operates in a sort
of fog, which reduces its ability to optimally shape private sector expectations. Full
transparency may then be the most desirable regime. We next allow for the private
sector itself to be uncertain about its own signal precision. As shown in Section 5,
its information. We ignore such a strategy since it is not sustainable in equilibrium.
4this assumption does not radically change the previous conclusions. The last section
brie￿ y summarizes our results and discusses limits and potential extensions.
2 The Model
We follow the literature on heterogeneous information as we imagine an economy
populated with a continuum of agents, each of whom makes one (static) decision based
on her utility function. The desirability of central bank transparency is then assessed
with a social welfare function that aggregates individual preferences. Part of the
debate about the desirability of central bank transparency hinges on the form of the
individual utility and social welfare functions. We borrow the model of Hellwig (2005)
who proposes a general utility function that encompasses many other formulations.
For illustration purposes, we interpret private agent actions as setting the price of
the goods that they each produce.
Since we assume that the central bank may decide to announce its chosen interest
rate, we need to allow for more than one fundamental. If there were only one funda-
mental, the interest rate decision would be fully revealing. We therefore assume that
there exist n fundamentals ￿k, k = 1;n > 2, which are independently, identically and
uniformly distributed so that E(￿k) = 0 8k and V ar(￿k) is inde￿nite.4 Their e⁄ect
on the price level is given by A￿ where ￿ = (￿1;￿2; ...,￿n)0 and A is a conformable
vector. The fundamentals are meant to capture all the exogenous factors that may
a⁄ect the economy while A represents the true model of the economy. We assume
that this model is known to all, an unsavory assumption that is further discussed in
the concluding section.
2.1 The private sector
Each private agent i 2 [0;1] decides on action pi - which we illustratively call the price
of her production - with two objectives: match the imperfectly known fundamental
A￿ and stay close to other agents action. This description of individual preferences
can be rationalized in di⁄erent ways, see M&S and Woodford (2005). Formally, the
preferences of private agent i 2 [0;1] are described by the following linear-quadratic
loss function:
Li = (1 ￿ r)(pi ￿ A￿)




(pj ￿ ￿ p)
2 dj ￿ (1 ￿ r)k2 (￿ p ￿ A￿)
2
where pi is the (log) price of the good from producer i and ￿ p =
R 1
j=0 pjdj is the
aggregate price index. The two ￿rst terms are a weighted average of the cost of
setting the price away from its fundamental value and of the cost of deviating from
4This assumption, which is of no economic interest, simpli￿es results.
5the average price. The relative weight r 2 [0;1] thus captures the degree of strategic
interaction among producers; it is the source of the beauty contest e⁄ect that lies at
the heart of the common knowledge e⁄ect emphasized by M&S. The last two terms,
with no sign restriction on k1 < 1 and k2, indicate how much each agent internalizes
the dispersion of prices and aggregate volatility or mispricing.5 These last two terms
do not a⁄ect producer i own decision since they do not depend on her choice of pi;
they represent externalities. The central bank, on the other hand, can take these
externalities into account when making its own decision. The loss function reduces
to the one used by M&S when k1 = r and k2 = 0 and to the loss function assumed
by Woodford (2005) when k1 = ￿r and k2 = 0.6 For this reason, for simplicity we
will henceforth assume that k2 = 0.
Taking other agents￿ s prices as given, agent i￿ s optimal choice is:
p
i = (1 ￿ r)E
i(A￿) + rE
i(￿ p) (1)
where Ei is conditional on the agent￿ s information set. The higher the interaction
parameter r the more producers react to the expected aggregate price and the less
they respond to the fundamentals. When setting her own price pi, agent i must guess
the aggregate price level, which depends on the prices set by all the other producers;
she must therefore guess what the other producers will guess, etc., which leads to
in￿nite iteration on guesses of guesses.
Each private agent is assumed to receive her own idiosyncratic signals about the
fundamentals ￿k. These signals are unbiased but noisy. The simplest representation
is to allow for an identically and independently distributed additive noise such that
agent i￿ s signal xi
k about fundamental ￿k is:
x
i
k = ￿k + ￿
i
k k = 1;::::n E(￿
i





where ￿k, the precision of private signal xi
k, is assumed to be the same for all private
agents.
Under these assumptions, we iterate (1) in￿nitely, and denoting ￿ En the nth order
expectation, we obtain the optimal pricing decision:
p









which exists when 0 < r < 1.
Without any loss of generality, we normalize the fudamentals ￿k so that Ak = 1
8k and A￿ =
Pn
k=1 ￿k.
5Hellwig (2005) allows for a ￿fth term ￿k3A￿(￿ p ￿ A￿) in the loss function. This term captures
the cost of mispricing due to the common knowledge e⁄ect.
6Thus M&S fully eliminate price dispersion from the social welfare function
R
Lidi while Wood-
ford gives it a weight of r.
62.2 The central bank
Like each private agent, the central bank receives some noisy but unbiased information
about the fundamentals:
~ ￿k = ￿k + "k k = 1;:::;n E("k) = 0 V ar("k) =
1
￿k
where the noises "k are independently and identically distributed, and are also in-
dependent of the private noise signals. The the precision of central bank signal xi
k
is ￿k.7 The central bank disposes of an instrument, the short-term interest rate R.
In principle, the interest rate has two e⁄ects: a macroeconomic e⁄ect, which a⁄ects
prices in addition to the fundamentals ￿k, and a signalling e⁄ect. We ignore the
macroeconomic e⁄ect because allowing for such a channel would greatly complicate
the model, precluding a closed-form solution. The assumption is unrealistic but it has
the advantage of focusing attention on the information content of the interest rate. It
sets the present paper as a complement to the large literature on optimal monetary
policy, which focuses on the macroeconomic e⁄ect of the interest rate with limited
attention to its information content. Here the central bank uses the interest rate
purely as a component of its communication strategy.8 Of course, the assumption is
not innocuous; we will indicate its implication where it matters.
The central therefore makes two decisions. It decides on its communication strat-
egy and on the interest rate. Any signal released by the central bank is public, in the
sense that all private agents receive it. Walsh (2007), instead, allows the central bank
to inform subsets of the private sector; the optimal degree of transparency concerns
the proportion of agents who are informed. Here the optimal degree of transparency
concerns the amount of information that is simultaneously released to all agents.
In deciding what information to reveal, the central bank maximizes social welfare,
i.e. it minimizes ECB R
i Lidi where the expectation operator is conditioned on the
central bank￿ s information set. The social loss is evaluated as the unconditional
average of private losses E
R
i Lidi. Thus the central bank preferences are well known
and are the same as those of the private sector; this eliminates the creative ambiguity
motive for limited transparency. We will examine the optimal choice of interest rate





7In line with the literature, we treat V ar(￿￿) as exogenous. Obviously, central bank signals are
based on variables that include private sector actions and, therefore, private sector signals. Ignoring
this dependence is subject to a Lucas critique since the precision of central bank signals may vary
with the policy regime and, in particular, on central bank transparency. We thank Hyun Song Shin
for attracting our attention to this limitation of our paper.
8The assumption can be seen as an extreme characterization of the observation by Woodford
(2005) that ￿ the current level of the overnight interest rates as such is of negligible importance for
economic decisionmaking￿ .
7with a normalization on R such that
Pn
k=1 ￿k = 1. Note that, to make its decision,
the central bank must forecast the pi￿ s, which requires guessing the private sector
forecasts, see (2).
3 Known Information Precision
We consider ￿rst the case when the second moments of both private and central bank
signals (V ar(￿i
k) and V ar(￿k)), and therefore their precision ￿k and ￿k, respectively,
are known. In this case, there are three possible degrees of transparency: full opacity
- denoted OP - when the central bank does not reveal anything; partial transparency
- denoted PT - when the central bank only reveals the optimally-chosen interest rate;
and full transparency - denoted FT - when the central bank reveals both the interest
rate and its signals ~ ￿k. We limit our study to the binary choice of releasing all or
none of the n signals.
3.1 Full opacity
The opacity case is trivial given that the interest rate, which by assumption only has
a signalling role, is not published. Each private agent receives her own idiosyncratic
signals xi
k, k = 1;n and has no further information. Her best estimate of the aggregate








The optimal price is the unweighted sum of the signals. Part of the reason is that
we have normalized them so that A￿ =
P
k ￿k. The other reason, which will soon
become clear, is that each agent receives only one signal about each fundamental and
thus has no better option than to take it at face value. The corresponding social loss
Lop is shown in the Appendix.
3.2 Partial transparency
We now consider the case when the central bank reveals its interest rate R. Each
private agent receives two kinds of signals: the interest rate, which they know is
optimally set by the central bank according to (3), and its own signals xi
k. Applying



















































1 ￿ r(1 ￿
Pn
k=1 ￿k)
The common knowledge e⁄ect is present: because each private agent observes R
and knows that the others do as well, she tends to overweight this signal. This is
due to the beauty contest assumption that each agent wishes to set her price close to
those of her competitors. Indeed, when the beauty contest assumption is eliminated,
r = 0 and ’k = ￿k: the weight on R corresponds exactly to optimal Bayesian signal
extraction. When r > 0, ’k > ￿k and ’k increases with the interaction coe¢ cient r.
See the Appendix for the corresponding value LPT of the social loss function.
3.3 Full transparency
Full transparency occurs when the central bank reveals both the interest rate and
all its signals e ￿k.In that case, the interest rate, which by (3) is just a linear com-
bination of the signals, does not provide any additional information and becomes a
useless instrument. Agent i now receives two signals about each fundamental ￿k: her
own signal xi
k, with precision ￿k, and the central bank signal e ￿k, with precision ￿k.
Applying Bayes rule, we have:
E





















￿k + (1 ￿ r)￿k
Here again, because the information released by the central bank is common
knowledge, it tends to receive an excessive weight in price setting. The Appendix
displays the associated social loss LFT.
93.4 Welfare comparisons
Formally, we can evaluate the losses under the three regimes of interest. We can
achieve a more general and more revealing result, however. Recall that the central
bank￿ s choice of the interest rate only matters in the partial transparency regime.
Under full opacity, the interest rate is not published and does not a⁄ect the economy;
under full transparency it does not bring any additional information. It turns out
that, in the transparency regime, the central bank can always choose the interest
rate so as to replicate the two other regimes, which implies that it can do better by
optimizing.
Comparing (4) and (6), we note that in the latter the coe¢ cient of R is
P ’j
￿j.
By choosing the policy coe¢ cients ￿j such that
P ’j


























￿j = 0 when
P ￿j
￿j = 0. Since
PN
j=1 ￿j = 1, we can eliminate any one














When the ￿js are not all equal , 1
￿j ￿ 1
￿n 6= 0 for some values of ￿j (we consider the
symmetric case ￿i = ￿j 8i;j below), there exists an in￿nite number of combinations
of the policy parameters ￿js such that
P ’j
￿j = 0. This means that a partially
transparent central bank can always set the interest rate in a way that mimics the
opacity case. It follows that, when it optimizes the choice of ￿j, a partially transparent
central bank can always do at least as well as an opaque central bank.
When ￿i = ￿j 8i;j, a partially transparent central bank can still mimic an opaque
central bank. Since their various signals have the same precision, Bayesian private
agents give the same weight in their forecasts to each fundamental. In that sense,
the fundamentals are equivalent and the central bank can no longer use its policy
parameters ￿k to manipulate private expectations.9 Still, the central bank can set
￿j = ￿1, which makes the interest rate uninformative (this is the solution to (10)
when ￿j ! ￿n for all j = 1;n ￿ 1). In this case, reproducing the opacity regime is
optimal and the two regimes become equivalent as far as welfare is concerned.




￿j = 0. When ￿i = ￿j 8i;j,
(9) shows that
’j
￿j is proportional to
￿j







j ￿j = 1 and the ￿j￿ s cancel out.
10We can apply the same logic to the comparison between the partial and full








￿j’j = ’k.10 Since
PN
k=1 ￿k = 1, this condition determines a unique set of
policy parameters ￿k. It follows that a partially transparent central bank can always
choose the interest rate to reproduce the outcome under full transparency. When it
optimizes, the partially transparent central bank stands to achieve at least the social
welfare reached under full transparency, and it can possibly do better.
Proposition 1 When the precision of central bank and private sector information
is known, partial transparency dominates both opacity and full transparency. This
result holds for any loss function (which preserves the price setting) and any number
of fundamentals.
The result is very general. It is independent of the welfare function since we do
not even need to specify optimal policy under partial transparency. It also holds
independently of the relative precision of central bank and private signals. It remains
valid even if the central bank reveals only a subset of the signals ~ ￿k that it has
received.11
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Under either opacity or full
transparency, the interest rate does not convey any signal. The central bank can use
the interest rate to optimally manipulate private expectations only in the partially
transparency regime. Relative to opacity, it uses the interest rate to enlarge the
private sector information set, but at the same time it creates a common knowledge
e⁄ect, which could have adverse welfare consequences. However, a shrewd - i.e.
optimizing - central bank can take this into account and make the interest rate a
useless signal through in￿nite interest rate volatility so as to achieve the same outcome
as under opacity. Similarly, in the case of full transparency, when the central bank
reveals all its information, it creates a distortionary common knowledge e⁄ect with no



































































11Indeed, an intermediate regime between partial and full transparency involves revealing R and
~ ￿k for k = 1;K while keeping con￿dential ~ ￿k for k = K + 1;n. In this case, R provides information
about the (optimal) linear combination of signals ~ ￿k, k = K + 1;n. A partially transparent central
bank can always choose ￿k for k = 0;K to mimic the corresponding full information and ￿k for
k = K + 1;n to mimic optimal policy with partial release of the corresponding signals.
11signaling instrument left to o⁄set it. Under the partial transparency regime, revealing
the interest rate is also the source of a common knowledge e⁄ect; here again, a shrewd
central bank can minimize the distortion through its choice of the interest rate.
The case when ￿i = ￿j 8i;j further illustrates the role of the assumption that the
interest rate does not play any macroeconomic role. We have seen that the optimal
solution for the central bank is to set ￿k = ￿1. In e⁄ect, the central bank creates
maximum volatility to make the interest rate uniformative. Obviously, such a policy
would be enormously costly if the interest rate had a macroeconomic e⁄ect and a
partially transparent central bank most likely would trade-o⁄ the macroeconomic
and communication e⁄ects.
3.5 The special case of full symmetry
As an illustration and for further reference, we consider the case where ￿k = ￿ and
￿k = ￿ 8k, i.e. signal precision is the same for each of the n fundamentals. Since we
already assume that A￿ =
Pn
k=1 ￿k, the full symmetry assumption makes the signals
"equivalent", yet distinct. This simpli￿cation does not a⁄ect the opacity and full
transparency regimes but it allows us to characterize optimal monetary policy in the
partial transparency regime. This is why, in the rest of the paper, we will limit our
study to the neighborhood of this full symmetry setup.
Under partial transparency, the price level is given by (6). Using the constraint Pn




















The Appendix shows that the central bank optimizes by setting ￿￿
k = 1
n. 8k = 1;n
if the following second order condition is satis￿ed:
(1 ￿ k1)￿ + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1)￿ > 0 (11)
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which are the same as under full transparency when R = 1
n
P~ ￿k. It follows that
LPT(￿￿) = LFT under symmetry, where ￿￿ = ( 1
n;::: 1
n).
To understand this result, recall that we have normalized the fundamentals so
that A￿ =
P
￿k. The assumption ￿k = ￿ and ￿k = ￿ 8k implies that, when
they make their forecasts, both the central bank and the private sector attribute the
same weight 1
n to all signals. It is natural therefore for the central bank to choose
R = 1
n
P~ ￿k. Using Bayes rule, the private sector then uses this information to infer
12that the central bank has received the signals ~ ￿k = R
n 8k. This prevents the central
bank from manipulating private sector expectations fundamental by fundamental.
Put di⁄erently, when the central bank is fully transparent, the private agents use this
information to set their prices pi by combining the signals ~ ￿k, k = 1;n revealed by
the central bank as if (12) applies with R = 1
n
P~ ￿k.
When the second order condition (11) is not satis￿ed, the loss function is mini-
mized when the central bank sets ￿k = ￿1 with signs such that
P
￿k = 1. Denote as
￿1 the corresponding vector of policy parameters. The partially transparent central
bank creates maximum interest rate volatility to remove any information value from
its policy decision. As a consequence, the partial transparency and opacity regimes are
identical, as previously noted. The fact that optimized partial transparency delivers
opacity also establishes that opacity welfare-dominates full transparency. Summariz-
ing, we have established the following:










The second order condition plays an important role. It involves all of the model￿ s
parameters and can be rewritten as ￿
￿ > ￿(1 ￿ r)
1￿2k1
1￿k1 . Intuitively, it is satis￿ed
when the relative precision of central bank signals ￿
￿ is high enough, when the common
knowledge e⁄ect is moderate because private agents are not too reactive to each
other￿ s prices, and when price dispersion is perceived as a negative externality (k1 < 0)
or a relatively low positive externality (k1 > 0 but not too large). It is always satis￿ed
when is k1 < 1
2.
The combined role of the relative precision of central bank signals and of private
sector reactivity is illustrated by previous results from in the literature. As noted
in Section 2.1, the welfare function chosen by M&S corresponds to k1 = r. In this
case the second order condition is satis￿ed and full transparency welfare-dominates
opacity when ￿
￿ > 2r ￿1, while opacity is the preferable regime in the opposite case.
The welfare function advocated by Woodford (2005) corresponds to k1 = ￿r in which
case the second order condition is always satis￿ed and opacity is never desirable.
The role of k1 is further illustrated as follows. We have seen that, when it sets
the interest rate under partial transparency, the central bank can reproduce the full
transparency outcome, and that it can even do better for social welfare, which implies
LFT ￿ LPT. We can make a similar, symmetric argument regarding the private sector.
Under full transparency, when the central bank releases all its information, the private
sector can always choose the same prices (6) as under partial transparency, and it
can do better by optimizing. This does not imply that LFT ￿ LPT, however, because
private agents cannot react to the aggregate price dispersion externality since they
are atomistic. The best that they can individually do is not socially optimal, while
the central bank internalizes the externality and delivers the social optimum. This is
why, in the end, as long as the externality is not strongly welfare-increasing, i.e. when
13k1 < 1
2, we have LFT > LPT; with LFT = LPT when k1 = 0. A conjecture, which is
con￿rmed below, is that the di⁄erence in losses LFT ￿LPT, which is non-negative, is
proportional to k2
1.
4 Private Information Precision Unknown to the
Central Bank
So far we have followed the existing literature in assuming that the variances of the
signals received by individual private agents and by the central bank are known. We
now allow for information precision to be imperfectly known. Speci￿cally, we assume
that the central bank information precision ￿k about signal ￿k,for k = 1;n, is known
to all but that the private sector information precision ￿k is unknown to the central
bank. Put di⁄erently, we assume that the private sector knows its own precision but
has no way to reveal it to the central bank.
The justi￿cation for this assumption is that the central bank forecasts are closely
monitored and evaluated by both the central bank itself and the private sector; pre-
sumably the central bank has the resources needed to evaluate its forecasting perfor-
mance and has no reason to hide its results from its watchers. On the other hand,
the central bank cannot observe the myriad of private sector forecasts well enough to
infer their precision.12 In the next section, we will consider the case when the private
information precision is also unknown to the private sector itself.
To keep the analysis tractable, for all signals ￿k, k = 1;n, we will consider small
deviations from the symmetric case studied in Section 3.5:
￿k = ￿ + uk (13)
￿k = ￿ + vk
where uk and vk are zero-mean random variables whose variances are unknown.13
While ￿k is public knowledge, we assume that private agents know ￿k, which is the
same for every agent. In contrast, the central bank erroneously believes that the
private sector precision is:
￿
0
k = ￿k + v
0
k (14)
12Why can￿ t the private sector communicate its own precision to the central bank? Conceivably,
it could, as it could reveal its signals; this would be welfare improving since it would eliminate the
information heterogeneity problem. The assumption that private sector information is heterogeneous
rests on the view that private sector information is inherently di⁄use, presumably because of the
multiplicity of agents, maybe also because of their limited resources.
13Otherwise we would have to formulate a hypothesis on the variances of uk and vk (the variances
of the variances of signals), a somewhat far-fetched variable, and we could not assume Bayesian
inference anymore.
14where v0
k, k = 1;n, are independent random variables with zero mean and variances
F 2
kv2
k. The proportionality term Fk represents a sort of ￿ fog￿under which the imper-
fectly informed central bank operates. Because of this fog, the central bank will be
unable to choose the same optimal interest rate as was the case in the previous section.
Instead of choosing the policy parameters ￿ =(￿1;:::;￿N) it will set ￿0 = (￿0
1;:::;￿0
N),
which is socially suboptimal.
4.1 Transparency regimes
When the central bank does not know the precision of private signals, we can identify
four transparency regimes: 1) full opacity; 2) interest rate (partial) transparency
(RPT) when the central bank only reveals its interest rate decision R; 3) interest rate
and precision (partial) transparency (RPPT) when the central bank reveals both the
interest rate and its estimates ￿
0 of private sector precision; 4) full transparency (FT)
when it also reveals its own signals e ￿ = (~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿n). As before, in our setup, the interest
rate decision is irrelevant in the polar regimes of opacity and full transparency. It
follows that the situation under opacity and full transparency is the same irrespective
of whether private sector precision is known or not.
In Section 3 partial transparency always welfare-dominates full transparency be-
cause the central bank can use the interest rate signal to partially o⁄set the common
knowledge e⁄ect. Does this result carry through to the case when the central bank
does not know the precision of private signals? Not necessarily so. Indeed, because
the interest rate decision will now rely upon erroneous knowledge, it may be that full
transparency provides a better outcome than either partial transparency regime.
Informally, we know that when all precision is known, LPT (￿￿) < LFT. The
only di⁄erence between partial tranparency when all precision is known and RPPT
when private sector precision is not known to the central bank is that, in the latter
case, the central bank uses incorrect precision estimates ￿
0 = (￿1;:::;￿N) to set
the interest rate. Thus it is likely to choose a suboptimal ￿0 = (￿0
1;:::;￿0
n) and
LRPPT (￿0) ￿ LPT (￿￿). Thus, we cannot directly compare LRPPT (￿0) and LFT.
Yet, for the same reason as before, we know that there exists a ^ ￿ such that, if
chosen by the central bank, would replicate the full transparency regime outcome,
i.e. that LRPPT (^ ￿) = LFT. There even exist optimal policy parameters ￿0￿ such
that LRPPT (￿0￿) < LFT. However, since the central bank does not know private
sector precision, it can only choose ￿0￿ by sheer luck. In fact, if the central bank
is su¢ ciently o⁄ the mark - if the fog is thick - it will in fact choose ￿0 such that
LRPPT (￿0) > LFT. We now prove this conjecture.
154.2 Welfare comparisons
4.2.1 Interest rate and precision partial transparency (RPPT) vs. full
transparency (FT)
We know from Section 3.5 that when precision is known, under symmetry, in the
partial transparency regime the central bank optimal policy is to set ￿￿
k = 1
n 8k when
the second order condition (11) is satis￿ed. In the neighborhood of the symmetric






where mk is presumed to be small.












































is the relevant aggregate measure of the
fog e⁄ect on central bank policy decisions. The Appendix also shows that ￿
￿ +
(1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1) > 0 when the second order condition (11) is satis￿ed.
Thus the presence of fog, the fact that the central bank is uncertain about private
signal precision, may reverse the welfare ranking of the partial and full transparency
regimes. When the central bank knows private information precision, it can opti-
mally choose the interest rate to deal with the common knowledge e⁄ect. When it
mistakenly appraises private sector information, the interest rate that it chooses is
no longer socially optimal. Full transparency, which makes the interest rate signal
useless, becomes more desirable when the fog is thick enough.
To interpret (15), note that when there is no price dispersion externality, i.e. when
k1 = 0, the threshold ￿ F = 0 and the slightest degree of fog is enough to make FT
the best communication regime. We have seen that, when the private sector signal
precision is known, partial and full transparency deliver the same welfare when k1 = 0.
Obviously, the presence of fog, which leads the central bank to make a mistake when
setting the interest rate, worsens the situation under partial transparency.
When the price dispersion externality is present so that k1 6= 0, partial trans-
parency becomes desirable because, by manipulating the interest rate, the central
bank partially internalizes the externality. The fog must be thick enough to make FT
welfare-superior. The threshold ￿ F increases with jk1j when k1 > 0 and declines with
jk1j when k1 < 0. When k1 > 0, the price dispersion externality raises welfare; the
common knowledge e⁄ect becomes increasingly undesirable as k1 becomes larger and
16interest manipulation under partial transparency stands to raise welfare. Conversely,
when k1 < 0, the price dispersion externality reduces welfare; the common knowledge
e⁄ect is good, as in Woodford (2005), and FT dominates even for low levels of fog.
The threshold ￿ F increases with ￿
￿, the relative precision of central bank signals.
Quite intuitively, a better informed central bank is better able to use the interest rate
to manipulate private expectations. The threshold also increases with the degree r
of reactivity of private agents to each other expectations. Indeed, a higher degree of
reactivity increases the common knowledge e⁄ect that the central bank can partially
o⁄set when it sets the interest rate.
The following proposition summarizes our results for the case when the second
order condition is satis￿ed:
Proposition 2 When the central bank does not know the precision of private sector
signals and when the relative information precision of the central bank is large enough
for the second order condition (11) to hold, full transparency is more desirable than
interest rate and precision partial transparency when the fog e⁄ect is large enough.
The threshold is lower, and full transparency is more desirable:
- the less precise is relative central bank information,
- the less reactive are private agents to each other expectations
- the stronger is the price dispersion externality when it reduces welfare
- the weaker is the price dispersion externality when it increases welfare.
When the second order condition (11) is not satis￿ed, the best option for the
central bank is to let the policy parameters ￿k become arbitrarily large in absolute
value, i.e. to mimic the opacity regime. This is the same result as when precision is
known, see Section 3.5. The only di⁄erence is that, when it is mistaken about private
sector precision, the central bank does not achieve what it wishes, which makes RPPT
less desirable. But this is a second order e⁄ect compared to the di⁄erence between
opacity and full transparency.14
Thus we reach the following result:







which can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 When the central bank does not know the precision of private sector
signals, full opacity is the most desirable communication strategy when the second
order condition (11) does not hold.
A comment is in order. The proposition favors opacity even though we stated
that Lop ’ E
￿
LRPPT￿
. In Section 3.5, under full symmetry when ￿k = ￿ and ￿k = ￿
14Formally, to a ￿rst order of approximation, we have Lop ￿ LFT = n￿
(1￿k1)￿+(1￿r)(1￿2k1)￿
￿(￿+(1￿r)￿)2 < 0.
The fog e⁄ects are of second order.




In the neighborhood of full symmetry, the optimal parameters become arbitrarily








or smaller than Lop because this solution depends on the unrealistic assumption that
the interest rate plays no macroeconomic role.
4.2.2 Interest rate partial transparency (RPT) vs. interest rate and pre-
cision partial transparency (RPPT)
In both cases the central bank sets the interest rate optimally based on incorrect
information about private sector precision. Under RPT, the private sector does not
know the central bank￿ s estimates of its precision. As a consequence its estimate
of the optimally chosen policy parameters, denoted e ￿= (~ ￿1;:::~ ￿n), di⁄ers from the
parameters ￿0 actually chosen by the central bank. In order to set her price, each
agent must therefore estimate both ~ ￿k and the central bank signals ~ ￿k, k = 1;n but
she does not observe e ￿. In order to estimate e ￿, therefore, she combines her knowledge
of the interest rate R with her guess of the central bank￿ s belief about her own signal
precision, given by (14). We assume that she makes the following guess:
~ ￿k = ￿k + v
0
k + ~ vk
with ~ vk centered around 0 and of variance ~ F 2
kv2
k. This additive uncertainty captures
the assumption that the central bank misestimates private sector precision and that
the private sector observes this estimate with a noise. The central bank fog Fk
generates a private sector fog ~ Fk. 15
The Appendix shows that, when the second order condition is satis￿ed, the un-
conditional expectation of the social loss under RPT is higher than the unconditional














This result naturally re￿ ects the spreading of uncertainty under RPT, which does
not occur under RPPT. In both regimes, the central bank optimally uses the interest
rate to fashion private sector expectations but its ignorance of private sector precision
leads it to choose a socially suboptimal set of policy parameters ￿0. Under RPPT,
the private sector can correctly estimate ￿0 because the central bank has revealed
its estimate ￿
0; under RPT, the private sector makes the imprecise inference e ￿ of ￿
0
which leads to socially suboptimal prices.
15All the results that follow generalize to the case where the central bank also ignores its own
precision. While formally identical to the problem at hand, this generalization has little economic
justi￿cation.
18When the second order condition is not satis￿ed and the optimal parameters
￿k ! ￿1, as before. We can show in the same way that (16) still holds, for the
same reason.
Proposition 4 When the central bank does not know the precision of private sig-
nals, if it publishes its interest rate, it is always preferable that it also reveals its
assessment of private signal precision, even though it is erroneous.
Finally, the analysis of the opacity regime is essentially the same as in Section
3. When the second order condition (11) holds, partial transparency - both RPT
and RPPT - welfare-dominates opacity for the same reason. When (11) does not
hold, it is possible for the central bank under either partial transparency regime to
let ￿k ! ￿1 which delivers an outcome close to that achieved under the opacity
regime. And here again, an optimizing central bank can do better than that, unless
the fog is thick and the central bank￿ s optimal choice is badly ￿ awed. We do not
pursue this comparison further because the policy under partial transparency implies
approximately mimicking opacity by making the interest rate highly volatile, which
we view as an unrealistic implication of our assumption that the interest rate plays
no macroeconomic role.
4.3 Discussion
The literature on monetary policy under perfect information has so far focused on
uncertainty about the economic fundamentals. Section 3 essentially generalizes that
literature to the case of an inde￿nite number of fundamentals to show that, indeed,
information heterogeneity leads to a common knowledge e⁄ect. In the present section,
we have added a second level of uncertainty, which concerns the precision of the
signals.
"Central bank information" therefore is now multidimensional. While poor in-
formation about the signals creates the common knowledge e⁄ect, poor information
about private signal precision generates a fog e⁄ect that reduces the e⁄ectiveness of
the central bank. While the welfare e⁄ects of signal uncertainty are ambiguous (as
re￿ ected in the contrasted results of M&S and Woodford), the fog e⁄ect unambigu-
ously makes full transparency more desirable. The intuition is clear. The central
bank uses the interest rate to a⁄ect private sector expectations to deal with the com-
mon knowledge e⁄ect and to correct for the price dispersion externality. When its
understanding of private sector pricing decision is ￿ awed because it misestimates pri-
vate sector precision, the central bank better contributes to welfare by not using the
interest rate as a signal. This is achieved by revealing directly all the information
rather a partial summary as with the interest rate.
A less obvious intuition is that a central bank that is mistaken about private sector
signal precision should truthfully reveal its mistaken beliefs. The reason is that the
the central bank uncertainty about private sector signal precision has two e⁄ects: it
19leads to a socially suboptimal interest rate decision, the fog e⁄ect, and it forces the
private sector to take into account the central bank mistaken beliefs, which leads to
another fog e⁄ect, which results in socially suboptimal pricing decisions. Removing
this second fog e⁄ect through full transparency can be welfare enhancing.
Yet, it is not always the case that more transparency is always better than less.
When its own signal precision is relatively low - when the second order condition (11)
is not satis￿ed - it may make sense for the central bank to be fully opaque and not
to reveal its interest rate. In that case, if the central bank cannot hide its interest
rate decision, it becomes optimal to make the rate uninformative. This result, as
previously mentioned, crucially depends on our assumption that the interest rate has
only a signalling role, i.e. it has no macroeconomic e⁄ect.
5 Private Information Precision Unknown to Both
the Central Bank and the Private Sector
We now extend the previous case to the situation where neither the central bank nor
the private sector know the precision of private sector information ￿. This may be an
assumption more germane to the idea of information heterogeneity. The underlying
view is that the central bank is very carefully monitored and devotes substantial
resources to collecting and processing information. On the other hand, the private
sector is composed of a large number of agents with limited resources and amongst
which information collection and processing is a strategic instrument, hence rather
secretive.
In line with the previous treatment of imperfect information, we consider the
situation in the neighborhood of the symmetric case, see (13), and we assume that




k = ￿k + v
00
k
where the error terms are independently distributed with zero mean and variance
G2
kv2
k for all k = 1;n. The assumptions about the central bank assessment of ￿ is
the same as in the previous section, see (14). The transparency regimes - publishing
only the interest rate (RPT) or both the interest rate and the central bank beliefs
about private sector precision (RPPT) - are also the same. As before, the polar
regimes of opacity and full transparency are not a⁄ected by the uncertainty about
signal precision because under either regime there is no (information) role for the
interest rate. We assume Knightian uncertainty, i.e. that the central bank knows the
existence of this fog but not the variances G2
kv2




k when the second order condition (11) is satis￿ed, otherwise it
sets ￿ ! ￿1.
205.1 Interest rate and precision partial transparency (RPPT)
vs. full transparency (FT)




both su⁄ered under the RPPT and FT regimes when
private signal precision is unknown to both the central bank and the private sector
with the corresponding di⁄erence E
￿
LRPPT (￿0) ￿ LFT￿
CB only when it is only the
central bank that is ill-informed.
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where G is a measure of private fog, similar to the measure F of central bank fog. (17)
shows that the impact of private sector uncertainty about its own precision depends
on the sign of ￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ 3k1￿.
Note ￿rst that the central bank fog does not a⁄ect this di⁄erence in di⁄erences:
the two fog e⁄ects are additive. We exploit this result as follows. In the FT regime,
the central bank does not make any useful decision, so the only optimizer is the price-
setting private sector. In the RPPT transparency regime, both the central bank and
the private sector optimize, but the additivity result allows us to interpret (17) by
reasoning as if the only optimizer in this regime is the central bank.
A ￿rst intuition from (17) is that the fog e⁄ect reduces the e⁄ectiveness of the
optimizer agent. We already saw in Section 4 that the central bank is less e⁄ec-
tive when it optimizes under uncertainty about private sector signal precision; full
transparency, when because the interest rate becomes a useless signal, tends to be
welfare-dominant. When private agents also su⁄er from their own fog e⁄ect, they
are less good at setting prices and this e⁄ect tends to make full transparency less
desirable. The e⁄ect is captured in (17) by the term ￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿ > 0.
In order to interpret the remaining term ￿3k1￿, we need to remember the result
from Section 3.5 that the price dispersion externality captured by k1 favors partial
transparency because the central bank can internalize this component of social wel-
fare. When k1 = 0 and there is no externality, the presence of a private fog e⁄ect
unambiguously makes RPPT more socially desirable than FT. This conclusion is re-
inforced when k1 < 0, i.e. when price dispersion is a social bad, because the central
bank is the optimizer under RPPT (in the sense indicated above). When k1 > 0, we
face a trade-o⁄. Now the price dispersion externality is a social good, which the cen-
tral bank takes into account as it makes its decision under interest rate and precision
partial transparency. But the private sector fog e⁄ect too leads to more price disper-
sion under both regimes.16 Because it ignores G - a case of Knightian uncertainty -
16More precisely, the presence of a private fog raises the unconditional expectation of price dis-
persion.
21the central bank cannot take this additional e⁄ect into account under RPPT, which
favors the FT regime. When k1 is large enough, this latter e⁄ect dominates. Note
that the role of the price dispersion externality is stronger the more precise is the
central bank - the larger is ￿ - because a highly precise central bank has a stronger
in￿ uence on private sector pricing decisions.
For completeness, we brie￿ y mention the case when the second order condition
(11) is not satis￿ed. As in Section 4, the central bank makes the interest rate un-
informative by choosing ￿ close to ￿1. Since the fog e⁄ects are of second order of








5.2 Interest rate partial transparency vs. interest rate and
precision partial transparency
The Appendix shows that, when the second order condition (11) is satis￿ed, the
central bank optimally sets ￿i ’ 1
n and the result of Section 4 still holds: RPPT
dominates RPT. Indeed, the existence of a private sector fog does not a⁄ect the
central bank behavior. Facing Knightian uncertainty about private sector fog, it
still chooses policy parameters ￿0; under RPT, the private sector still infers that
the central bank has chosen e ￿, which leads to the welfare reducing bias previously
described. When, in addition, it is subjected to its own fog, the private sector sets
socially suboptimal prices. The resulting adverse e⁄ect on welfare is similar under
RPT and RPPT; whatever di⁄erence exists, it is small relative to the bias due to the
central bank fog.
The same reasoning applies when (11) is not satis￿ed.
5.3 Welfare implications
The previous analysis is summarized as follows for the case when the second order
condition (11) holds:
Proposition 5 Comparing the situation when the private sector knows its own
signal precision and when it does not, and still assuming that the central bank does
not know private sector signal precision:
- interest rate transparency is always welfare-dominated by interest rate and precision
partial transparency
- the welfare case for interest rate and precision partial transparency is enhanced when
the price dispersion externality reduces welfare
- the welfare case for full transparency is enhanced when the price dispersion exter-
nality raises welfare, especially when the (actual) relative precision of central bank
information is relatively large relative to private sector information.
22In the end, private sector fog does not play as strong a qualitative role as central
bank fog. The reason is that, through the interest rate, the central bank plays a
signaling role, while the private sector only make pricing decisions. The central bank￿ s
signaling role implies a common knowledge e⁄ect, which is partly welfare reducing,
because of too much attention, and partly welfare-increasing, because it reduces price
dispersion. The resulting trade-o⁄remains unchanged even in the presence of private
sector fog.
Finally, for completeness, we note that the conclusions previously reached regard-
ing the opacity regime remain valid. When (11) is veri￿ed, a partially transparent
central bank can always do better than a fully opaque one. When (11) does not hold,
opacity is optimal.
6 Conclusions
Information heterogeneity among private agents has emerged as a key consideration
in the literature on central bank transparency. Information heterogeneity leads to the
common knowledge e⁄ect whereby private agents attach a strong weight to central
bank signals not necessarily because the central bank is well informed but because
its signals are widely observed. Knowing that other agents will respond to central
bank signals give these signals an importance that exceeds their precision. This e⁄ect
can make transparency desirable or not, depending on the assumed social welfare
function.
The present paper extends the literature in four directions. First, it allows for
more than one economic fundamental. Second it adds the interest rate to the list of
signals that the central bank can reveal. Third, it extends the range of uncertainties
that matter. So far the literature has focused on uncertainty about the economic
fundamentals, which are supposed to be estimated with known precision; here we
also allow for uncertainty about precision. Fourth, it derives results that are general
in the sense that they do not depend on any particular social welfare criterion. Each
extension sheds new light on the role of central bank transparency.
Allowing for more than one economic fundamental shows that the central bank
communication policy rests on exploiting the di⁄erences in the stochastic patterns
of the corresponding signals. A contrario, when all signals are drawn from the same
known distribution,17 which may di⁄er between the central bank and the private
sector signals, any partial release by the central bank of its own signals, e.g. by
announcing the optimally chose interest rate, amounts to releasing all signals. Then
the central bank is left with a binary choice of transparency regimes, full opacity or
full transparency. The multiplicity of independent signal fundamentals provides the
central bank with a wider menu of transparency regimes.
The use of the interest rate as a communication tool has not been examined so
17When ￿i = ￿j and ￿i = ￿j 8i;j .
23far, we believe. Here we go to the polar situation when the interest rate is only
a communication tool. Full transparency occurs when the central bank faithfully
reports all the signals that it has received. Full transparency, therefore, is a passive
regime, since it deprives the interest rate from any additional information value. In
contrast, with less than full transparency, the central bank can use the interest rate to
shape private sector expectations. This makes the interest rate a strategic signal.18
In particular, the central bank can optimally set the interest rate to mitigate the
common knowledge e⁄ect when it is detrimental to social welfare or to exploit it
when it enhances social welfare.
When signal precision is known, we essentially reproduce the results previously
established in the literature, although we cast them more generally using the social
welfare function proposed by Hellwig (2005), which encompasses the special cases
proposed by M&S and by Woodford (2005). In fact, in this case, we establish results
that are independent of the speci￿cation of the welfare function. Partial transparency,
de￿ned as the publication of the optimally set interest rate, dominates both opacity
and full transparency. The reason is that opacity prevents the central bank from
a⁄ecting private sector expectations while full transparency makes the interest rate
uninformative since the central bank has revealed everything that it knows. We show
that the result by M&S, that opacity can be optimal, depends on two assumptions:
that all signals are drawn from the same distribution and, as shown by Woodford
(2005), that the social welfare function ignores the negative externality associated
with individual price dispersion. Similarly, we show that the result by Woodford
(2005), that full transparency dominates, also depends on two assumptions: that
all signals are drawn from the same distribution and that the negative externality
associated with individual price dispersion is strong enough.
Allowing for uncertainty regarding the precision of private signals profoundly
changes the picture. Because it misjudges private signal precision, the central bank
operates in sort of fog. As a result, its optimally chosen interest rate is in fact socially
suboptimal. This makes partial transparency regimes less desirable since the central
bank￿ s ability to optimally shape private expectations is impaired. In this case, there
is no generally optimal transparency regime. When the fog is thick, i.e. when the
misjudgment of private sector precision has a large variance, full transparency be-
comes the most desirable regime. Obviously, as the fog gets thinner, we move back
toward the case when signal precision is known and partial transparency becomes
optimal again.
This result holds whether the private sector knows or not its own signal precision.
When the private sector also operates in a fog because it misjudges its own signal
precision, nothing is qualitatively changed regarding the central bank interest rate
decision. The main di⁄erence is that private agents caught in the fog make individ-
ually optimal decisions that are in fact socially suboptimal. Whether it makes one
18The release of some optimally chosen signals would provide the central bank with a similar tool.
We have not examined this issue, which is left for further research.
24transparency regime more preferable or not depends on the relative actual precision
of central bank signals relative to private sector signals. Quite logically, the more pre-
cise is this actual relative precision, the better is the central apt at shaping private
sector expectations and, ceteris paribus, the more desirable is the partial transparency
regime.
Obviously, the present paper su⁄ers from a number of limitations that should
be kept in mind before drawing policy conclusions. To start with, the interest rate
plays no direct macroeconomic role in our model. Its only function is to convey
some information about the central bank signals. While unrealistic, this assumption
allows us to isolate the information content of the interest rate. If the interest rate
were to also play a macroeconomic role, the central bank would have to trade o⁄
the macroeconomic and signaling e⁄ects of its monetary policy decisions. This would
reduce the attractiveness of the kind of interest rate manipulation that we focus upon
and, probably, increase the attractiveness of the full transparency regime. Indeed,
under full transparency, the interest rate loses its signal content, which makes it
entirely available to play its macroeconomic role.
Another limitation is that we assume that the only source of uncertainty concerns
the economic fundamentals. It can be argued that, in fact, this uncertainty is rather
small, at least in comparison with our lack of understanding of the ￿ true￿economic
model. In that view, the most challenging communication issue faced by central
banks is to give a sense of the model that they have in mind.19 In our framework,
the economic model is subsumed by just one equation. It is captured in (1) by the
term A￿. We assume that vector A, which captures the model￿ s structure,is known
while the fundamentals included in vector ￿ are stochastic. Treating both A and
￿ as stochastic would be a major complication; it is left for further research. One
possibility is to invert things: let ￿ be known and allow A to be stochastic. Obviously,
then, this is a matter of rewriting the story and the results would qualitatively survive
intact.20
Finally, partial information here means revealing some categories of information
(the signals, the interest rate, signal precision). Another approach would be for the
central bank to reveal a subset of each category, for example a subset ~ ￿k of k = 1;K
with K < n of its signals. Indeed, it could be argued that the set of relevant signals is
too large for a central bank to ever be fully transparent. This issue is left for further
research but the following remarks suggest the issues likely to emerge. Under partial
transparency, the central bank reveals the interest rate, which is a linear combination
of its signals. The only di⁄erence between revealing the interest rate and just one
of the n signals is that the interest rate is an optimal combination of the signals,
19This is the point made by our discussant, Charles Bean.
20We have not chosen this route because it has proven convenient to normalize A by setting
Ak = 1 8k. We could normalize the fundamentals and set ￿k = 1 8k, but we ￿nd this approach
unappealing. Indeed, it becomes unclear what are the fundamentals if they are all constant and
equal.
25which allows the central bank to fashion private expectations and thus deal with
the common knowledge e⁄ect. For that reason, revealing the interest rate stands
to welfare dominate revealing one signal. It may even dominate revealing two or
more signals but, some way along the road, revealing a large number of signals may
dominate. The larger is the fog e⁄ect, the more this form of partial transparency is
likely to be socially optimal.
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￿2 1
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+ (1 ￿ k1)
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Given (5), 2 implies:
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for i > 1
Mij = ￿ij ￿
￿j￿1￿i￿1
￿i￿1
for i > 1, for j > 1
A = (1;:::;1) 1 ￿ n
A straightforward computation of AM 1￿r
1￿rM leads to (6).
Proof of the results in Section 3.5











































￿2 ￿ 2(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)￿

































￿2 ￿ 2￿[￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿]






+ (1 ￿ r)
￿










k) and recalling the
restriction
Pn
k=1 ￿k = 1, it follows that the ￿rst order condition implies ￿k = 1
n.





PT (￿) = 2
(1 + ￿ij)[(1 ￿ k1)￿ + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1)￿]






be positive semi-de￿nite. This condition is satis￿ed i⁄(1 ￿ k1)￿+(1 ￿ r)(1￿2k1)￿ >




In what we follows, we use the constraint
Pn
k=1 ￿k = 1 to eliminate ￿n. We ￿rst com-
pute the optimal policy parameters ￿k = ￿￿
k +mk around the symmetric equilibrium
￿￿
k = 1
n when the private sector signal precision is known. These parameters are are
such that @LPT
@￿k = 0 for all k = 1;n ￿ 1. A second order expansion of this condition


















where the second order derivatives are evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium ￿k = ￿,
￿k = ￿, ￿￿
k = 1
n., which assumes that the second order condition is satis￿ed. De￿ning
as m, u and v as the vectors of mk, uk and vk, respectively, the ￿rst order conditions

























































kjvj). Since we have eliminated ￿n the matrices N￿ and
N￿ have size n ￿ 1 ￿ n.
Close to the symmetric equilibrium, using the condition
P
￿k = 1, we have:
@LPT
@￿i@￿j
= ￿2(1 ￿ r)￿
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1)
￿(￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r))
3 (￿ij ￿ ￿in)n
@LPT
@￿i@￿j
= 2(1 ￿ r)￿
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1)






PT (￿) = ￿2
(1 + ￿ij)[(1 ￿ k1)(￿2 ￿ 2(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)￿) + (1 ￿ r)￿￿]
￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
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2((1 ￿ k1)(￿2 ￿ 2(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)￿) + (1 ￿ r)￿￿)n
Using (A2), we get:
mk =
2(1 ￿ r)￿￿
2((1 ￿ k1)(￿2 ￿ 2(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)￿) + (1 ￿ r)￿￿)n
￿
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1)















which applies to k = 1;:::n since the constraint
P
￿k = 1 can be used to compute
mn.




￿ LFT. When the central bank
believes that private sector precision is ￿
0 = ￿ +v0, under interest rate and precision
partial tranparency it optimally chooses ￿0 = ￿ + m0, which delivers social loss
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PT (￿) ￿ L
FT￿
(A3)
Moreover a second order expansion, using (A1), shows that :
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(￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿)
4
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obtain (15), we note that ￿
￿ + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ 2k1) > 0 when (11) is satis￿ed. Indeed,
since 0 < r < 1, this is the case when k1 < 0. When k1 > 0, (11) also ensures that
this is the case.
Proof of (16)
When precision is known, the loss under the partial transparency regime is:
L
PT(￿









































32The ￿rst term corresponds to the deviation of prices from their fundamentals.
















where c = 1 ￿ r.
The same decomposition applies to the interest rate partial transparency regime
when private sector precision is unknown to the central bank:
Similarly, when private sector precision is unknown to the central bank, the loss




















































Note that ￿ L(e ￿) now is a stochastic variable because, since the private section
precision is stochastic, the central bank￿ s choice of the interest rate itself is stochastic.
Recall that R =
Pn
k=1 ￿0
k~ ￿k is the interest rate actually chosen by the central
bank based on its estimate ￿
0 of private sector precision. We de￿ne ~ R =
Pn
k=1 ~ ￿k~ ￿k
as the notional interest rate that the private sector would expect if it could observe
the central bank signals ~ ￿k based on its own guess e ￿ of ￿
0. We make this mismatch















































































as the unconditional expectation of the loss that would
have occurred if the central would have chosen, and announced the notional interest
rate ~ R and ￿























































































The ￿rst term has already been shown to be positive when (11) is veri￿ed. It
remains positive even when (11) is not met, at least when evaluated around the



































































































































































































































































































The ￿rst term is positive and in￿nitely large with respect to the two last ones. As
a consequence E
￿
LRPT(￿0; e ￿) ￿ LRPPT(￿0)
￿
> 0 as claimed in the text. This result
evidences the role of the bias ~ ￿k ￿ ￿0
k between the parameters chosen by the central
bank ￿0
k and those ~ ￿k guessed by the private sector. Note that the proof is independent





















k. Then (A3) formally holds but the last term becomes E
￿
LPT (￿) ￿ LFT￿
.
Indeed LPT (￿)￿LFT is now stochastic because the private sector mistakenly believes
35that the central bank estimate of private sector signals is ￿
00 whereas it really is ￿.
Using the expressions given above for the losses when private sector precision is known
to both the central bank and the private sector, we expand E
￿
LRPPT (￿) ￿ LFT￿




















































































Developing this expression to the second order around v00











































































(1 ￿ 3k1)￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿














where we have replaced ￿0
j with 1























































￿k + (1 ￿ r)￿k
￿2 1
￿k
+ (1 ￿ k1)
￿
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36as asserted in the text. Adding private sector imperfect knowledge of its own precision
introduces a new source of uncertainty captured by the terms v00
k.
The additional e⁄ect created by the assumption that the private sector believes
that its own signal precision is ￿
00 is captured by the second term. If this term
is positive, resp. negative, interest rate and precision partial transparency becomes
more, resp. less, desirable than when the private sector knows its own signal precision.
This establishes (17).
Proof of the result in Section 5.2









sector precision is unknown to the central bank only also holds when it is also un-









in nearly the same way so that the sign of the
di⁄erence between these two terms is una⁄ected.

















































Next, we note that (A6) holds at the second order of approximation when replacing














(1 ￿ 3k1)￿ + (1 ￿ r)￿






























































































































































































































































































larger because ￿ is uniformly distributed. As a consequence E
￿
LRPT(￿0; e ￿) ￿ LRPPT(￿0)
￿
both >
0, which proves our assertion. This conclusion has been established irrespective of
whether condition (11) is satis￿ed or not.
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